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Abstract 
The paper pursues a two-fold objective. From a methodological viewpoint it shows 
how to carry out an impacts evaluation of exogenous shocks on poverty and inequality 
in a context characterized by out-of-equilibrium, poorly-adjusting markets, as it is the 
case in many developing countries, using a social account matrix framework. From an 
empirical viewpoint it provides an assessment of how the cereal price spikes of 2007-
2008 and the global recession of 2008-2009 have impacted the welfare of Syrian 
households and how did they compound with the on-going agricultural sector 
liberalisation implemented by the Government of Syria over the last decade. This will 
contribute to shed some lights on the economic background behind the spreading of 
unrest across the country over the last year or so. 
The results show that liberalisation impacts are very different and largely affected 
by the adopted budget closure rules. While reforms aiming at reducing agricultural 
market distortions (such as production subsidies and price support for strategic crops) 
could generally have a positive effect on both growth and poverty and inequality, the 
elimination of food security interventions (such as food stamp schemes) determines 
an adverse distributional impact against rural household and an increase of poverty. 
The recent macroeconomic shocks (food price crisis and the global recession) 
determined a generalized poverty increase and showed an income distribution bias 
against rural households. 
Two fundamental policy implications can be drawn by this study. First, the 
liberalisation of agricultural sector shows a significant growth potential and is likely to 
determine positive effects on poverty through a generalised increase of incomes as 
well as public budget savings that could be used for pursuing other policy goals. 
Second, in the short-run there is a structural trade-off between equity improvements 
and poverty alleviation: the policy options that will more likely reduce absolute 
poverty show undesirable distributive biases (both on overall inequality and on rural 
households vis-à-vis urban households). This calls for a careful targeting of how to use 
budget savings generated by agriculture liberalisation. 
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1. Introduction 
Exogenous shocks, such as the recent food price spikes or the global 
recession, and policy reform, such as market liberalisation, have 
differentiated impacts on households’ welfare according to the household 
level of poverty and livelihood strategy. Therefore, any study aiming at 
assessing those impacts must be able to capture the transmission 
mechanisms of those shocks to different income and livelihood groups. This 
is particularly relevant in middle-income countries that are already on their 
own way towards modernization and diversification of their economic 
structure.  
A suitable framework for this exercise is represented by the social 
accounting matrix (SAM), that is ‛a comprehensive, flexible and 
disaggregated framework that elaborates and articulates the generation of 
income by activities of production and the distribution and redistribution of 
income between social and institutional groups’ (Round, 2003: 162). A first, 
methodological objective of this paper is to propose an analytical framework 
to carry out a SAM-based assessment of exogenous shocks and policy 
impacts on poverty and inequality in a context featuring out-of-equilibrium 
poorly adjusting markets, as is the case in many developing countries.  
Syria is a good example of such conditions. It is a lower-middle income 
country with a quite diversified economy (agriculture accounting for 22.9% 
of GDP, industry for 30.6% and services for 40.5% in 2009) (NAPC, 2007; 
World Bank, 2011), a relatively unequal income distribution (the Gini index 
was 0.374 in 2004, but the bottom 20% of population accounted only for 
7.2% of Syria total expenditure, while the richest 20% consumed more than 
40%) and a poverty headcount ranging between 10% to 33% of total 
population (according to the extreme or standard national poverty line, 
respectively), but with significant differences across regions (El Laithy and 
Abu-Ismail, 2005).  
Syria has entered a process of economic reform since mid 1990s aiming 
at transforming a centrally planned economy into a so-called ‘social market 
economy’, that is a market economy characterised by an active role by the 
Government. This process has accelerated over the last five years or so and 
also agriculture is on its way to liberalisation. This process of policy reform 
and structural transformation has been recently impaired by the political 
crisis caused by the unprecedented wave of protests spreading out across 
the country since early 2011. However, before the protests Syria had been 
hit by two major economic shocks, namely the price crisis and the global 
recession. Thus it would be interesting to assess how those shocks have 
impacted the welfare of Syrian households and how did they compound with 
the on-going policy reform process. This will contribute to shed some lights 
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on the economic background behind the spreading of unrest across the 
country over the last year or so.1 
The paper is organised as follows. The following section puts the study in 
perspective, summarising the main findings of the literature on agricultural 
sector liberalisation and its outcomes in terms of poverty and inequality. 
Section 3 provides some background information on the Syrian economy 
and its recent developments. Section 4 describes data sources, modelling 
approach and simulation strategy of the study. Simulation results are 
discussed in section 5. Finally, section 6 summarises the main findings of 
the paper. 
2. Poverty and Distributive Impacts of Agricultural Sector 
Liberalisation 
2.1. Development strategies and agricultural liberalisation 
Development strategies implemented after World War II have for a long 
time neglected the potential role of agriculture as an engine of growth. 
According to the then dominant structuralist view, agriculture was a low 
productivity sector, seen as a mere pool of resources (both human and 
financial) to be extracted at low cost for the development of non-agricultural 
sectors (Lewis, 1954). Not surprisingly import-substitution industrialisation 
became the dominant development strategy until early 1980s (Schiff and 
Valdes, 2002; Panagariya, 2005). As a result, policies in most developing 
countries were harming their farmers, either directly through taxes on 
agricultural exports or indirectly by way of manufacturing protection or 
overvalued exchange rates (Kreuger et al., 1988). Furthermore, agriculture 
in developing countries was harmed also by competition in world markets 
from high-income countries pro-agricultural policies (Anderson, 2010). 
As pointed out by Kreuger et al. (1991) this bias against agriculture can 
be summarised in a few stylised facts. Until mid 1980s the poor countries 
have generally taxed, while rich countries subsidised, their agriculture, 
although this must be qualified recalling that almost all countries tended to 
protect their import-competing sectors and to tax their exporting sectors. 
The major reasons for agriculture taxation were to help the urban sector, 
mostly the politically influential upper and middle income groups rather than 
the urban poor, and/or industry, through the impacts on the wages of urban 
workers. Moreover, the international price instability forced developing 
countries into intervening with agricultural prices in order to stabilise their 
domestic markets, although the same objective could have reached with 
different, less costly instruments (e.g. stockpiling). 
                                                 
1
 However, it should be emphasized that the protests are only partially 
related to economic reasons, such as the impact of global recession on the 
poor, but more basically to political reasons, such as the request for 
democracy and freedom. 
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Looking at the historical evolution of interventions in agricultural 
markets, a common pattern emerges: countries have tended to gradually 
change from taxing to subsidising agriculture increasingly relative to other 
sectors in the course of their economic development. Hence at any point in 
time farmers in poorer countries tended to face depressed terms of trade 
relative to product prices in international markets, while the opposite was 
true for farmers in richer countries, with the exception of rich countries with 
an extreme comparative advantage in agriculture (e.g. Australia and New 
Zealand). 
In short, during the first four decades after the World War II agricultural 
markets in developing economies have been targeted by a complex and 
intertwined set of policies, both sector and economy-wide, that heavily 
affected the efficiency and profitability of the farming sector as well as 
household’s welfare. By and large, these interventions have reduced 
national and global economic welfare, inhibited economic growth, and 
increased inequality and poverty because most of poorest people in the 
world have been dependent directly or indirectly on farming for their 
livelihoods (World Bank, 2007).  
The last two or three decades have been marked by a sharp change in 
favour of a ‘free market, free trade, laissez-faire’ policy environment that 
led to the globalisation of world markets and to more liberalisation-oriented 
policies at national level. As a result, the anti-agricultural bias has been 
gradually removed in most developing countries, while agricultural 
protectionism and export subsidies in developed economies has been 
sensibly reduced or re-oriented towards less distorting instruments (such as 
decoupled direct payments to farmers). According to Anderson et al. (2010) 
the rate of assistance to farmers relative to producers of non-farm tradables 
has fallen by one third in high-income countries since the late ‘80s (from 
51% to 32%), while in developing countries this relative rate of assistance 
has risen from minus 41% in the early 1980s to 1% in 2000-2004. 
Nevertheless, distortions in agricultural markets are still relevant: the 
contribution of farm and food policies to the welfare cost of global distorting 
policies in developing countries alone is estimated at 83%, of which one 
third generated by the policies of developing countries themselves 
(Valenzuela et al., 2009). As emphasised by Anderson et al. (2010: 5) in a 
recent comprehensive World Bank research ‛while it is true that recent 
studies indicate that agricultural policies are responsible for the majority of 
the global welfare costs of the remaining distortions to goods markets, 
removing these policies could affect national poverty levels either negatively 
or positively’.  
2.2. Agricultural liberalisation impacts  
Despite the received economic wisdom maintains that liberalisation by 
enhancing economic efficiency is also likely to reduce poverty, the wide 
differentiation of country-specific contexts as well as well as the variable 
success of agricultural reform experiments actually determined a mixed 
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evidence record. For example, Gardner (1992) analysing seven agricultural 
policy reform case studies2 found that in only four countries the real 
commodity price increased significantly in the post-reform as compared to 
the pre-reform period, in six out of seven countries the agricultural output 
grew in the post-reform as compared to the pre-reform period, in five out 
seven countries the overall real GDP per capita grew and the multifactor 
productivity grew faster after the reform than before in each country, 
notably in a period when there was no acceleration of agricultural 
productivity growth in the world generally. However, Gardner stressed also 
that agricultural policy reforms could easily be stymied in an adverse 
macroeconomic environment. 
Gardner’s assessment was quite simple, using only a post-reform vs. 
pre-reform comparison of a few aggregate indicators, and did not take into 
account the impact of reform on poverty and inequality. More recent studies 
have addressed these issues, either ex post or ex ante (that is using 
simulation techniques).  
The ex post empirical evidence is quite controversial. Harrison (2007) 
showed that globalisation (interpreted as a process increasing liberalisation 
of economic activities and trade) generates winners and losers among the 
poor, with poverty being more likely reduced whenever complementary 
policies are implemented. According to McMillan et al. (2007: 228) OECD 
agricultural policies ‛are not correlated with the poverty rate or with income’ 
in developing countries. Conversely, at least in the short run, developing 
countries that are net food importers and have a large share of net food 
buyers among the poor, are likely to benefit of international prices 
depressed by subsidised export from developed countries (Panagiriya, 
2005; McMillan et al., 2007). Another controversial effect has been detected 
with reference to labour mobility. Ex post evidence shows that ‛the poor in 
countries with abundance of unskilled labour do not always gain from trade 
reform’ (Harrison, 2007: 3), mainly due to barriers in inter-sector factor 
mobility. This evidence is at odds with the results of economy-wide ex ante 
simulations, showing that trade liberalisation and the removal of support 
provided to farmers in developed countries ‛would raise the real earnings of 
unskilled labourers in developing countries, most of whom working in 
agriculture’ (Anderson et al., 2010: 37). Indeed, the poorest are often 
suppliers of unskilled labour but are also less likely to migrate, due to 
severe capital constraints (Skeldon, 2002); furthermore they are also less 
                                                 
2 The seven countries analysed by Gardner are five developing countries 
(Chile, Mexico, Madagascar, Ghana and Indonesia), one transition economy 
(Hungary) and one developed country (New Zealand). In assessing 
Gardner’s results, it should be kept in mind that the case studies are all 
success stories, while failed or incomplete agricultural policy reforms 
generally outnumber the successes. 
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likely to take advantage of the opportunities generated by a diversification 
of the rural economy (Waddington and Sabates-Wheeler, 2003).3 
In more recent years most of literature assessed the potential impacts of 
agricultural reform on poverty and inequality impacts from an ex ante 
perspective using sophisticated economy-wide national and global models. A 
recent, comprehensive study at the World Bank (Anderson et al., 2010) 
addressed those issues carrying out micro-simulation exercises based on 
household survey data, in conjunction with economy-wide computable 
general equilibrium models. The specific research question addressed by 
Anderson et al. (2010: 5) is ‛how much scope is there to reduce poverty and 
inequality in the world and in specific developing countries by unilaterally or 
globally eliminating the distortions in the incentives affecting the producers 
and consumers of tradable goods?’ In this case also the evidence is quite 
controversial: despite a positive impact on overall poverty, extreme poverty 
may be increased in many countries; besides a positive effect on rural-
urban inequality, a more controversial impact on inequality within rural and 
urban sectors emerges as well. 
The main policy lessons from empirical analyses are that liberalisation 
alone is not enough and the sequence of reforms matter in addressing 
poverty through liberalisation, both in macroeconomic policy and in 
agricultural sector (Schiff and Valdés, 2002; Harrison, 2007; Brooks, 2010). 
Moreover the distributive effects are likely to be highly asymmetric between 
and within social groups, calling for complementary social policies (Brooks, 
2010). 
2.3. Modelling Issues 
Most of the models used in ex ante analysis are static and assume 
competitive markets and full flexibility in the adaptation of the economy to 
exogenous and policy-driven shocks. Those are unrealistic hypotheses that 
do not take into account the structural asymmetries and rigidities affecting 
developing countries’ economies. As emphasised by Taylor and von Arnim 
(2006: 42), ‛especially in developing countries (with historically trade 
deficits, huge debt problems, and large informal economy with 
underemployment in modern sector), fixing the current account, the 
government deficit and employment makes no sense’. This is likely to imply 
a bias towards too optimistic estimates of liberalisation effects.  
A good example of these drawbacks is represented by three recent 
computable general equilibrium studies on Syria (Lucke, 2001; Minot et al., 
2007; Bibi, 2009). Despite some rigidities in the exchange rate adaptation 
(taken into account by two studies, namely Lucke, 2001 and Bibi, 2009) and 
in the labour market (taken into account only by Bibi, 2009) all these 
studies assume profit maximising firms, utility maximising households, 
                                                 
3 Despite some studies on livelihood strategies show a positive correlation 
among agricultural productivity, per-capita income and off-farm income 
share (Ellis and Freeman, 2004). 
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competitive markets and perfect labour mobility among sectors. Finally, the 
disaggregation of production sector is generally poor. Not surprisingly 
simulations yield quite trivial results such as a generalised increase in 
poverty after the economic downturn in the global economy (Bibi et al., 
2009), or positive welfare effects affecting only the highest income decile of 
total population generated by the removal of subsidies to wheat production 
(Minot et al., 2007). 
The simulation strategy adopted in our study is different, being designed 
to mimic as much close as possible the situation really existing in the Syrian 
economy, marked by structural rigidities and still largely controlled markets. 
Given the objective of the study (that is assessing the poverty and 
distributive impacts of agricultural liberalisation and exogenous shocks), a 
considerable effort has been devoted to develop a highly disaggregated 
model, taking into account the differentiated nature of Syrian agriculture as 
well as various household income levels (NAPC, 2008; cf. section 4.1. 
below). Moreover, a short-run, linear (keneysian) model specification was 
preferred in representing the still largely planned, out-of-equilibrium Syrian 
economy conditions (cf. section 4.2). Finally, to increase simulation realism 
, in designing scenarios alternative options of liberalisation in the 
agricultural policy were combined with different macroeconomic constraints 
affecting the Government budget (cf. section 4.3). 
3. The Syrian Economy: Background and Recent Economic 
Developments 
Over the last year or so, Syria has witnessed an unprecedented wave of 
protests. The demonstrators progressively increased their demands, from 
an initial request for political reforms to an end to the Baath party regime. 
The economic impact of the crisis already appears to be significant, with the 
tourism, financial and trade sectors affected the most (World Bank, 2011). 
There are also indications that foreign direct investment has dried up, 
forcing the Syrian authorities to take costly measures to defend the stability 
of the Syrian Pound and to prevent capital flight. However, prior to the 
recent crisis, which is the period of interest for this study, Syria’s economic 
reform efforts have helped to strengthen its growth performance. 
Despite the global financial crisis has adversely affected Syria’s 
macroeconomic performance, the per capita income in 2010 peaked at 
2,750 US$ (5,120 PPP international $, Table 1). Between 1960 and the turn 
of the century, Syria experienced a fairly high rate of growth (on average 
4.6% per year), which however did not exceed much the population growth 
rate (3.3% per year) over the same period. Over the last decade the 
economy of Syria has been growing at a healthy pace: between 2000 and 
2010 the GDP grew by 4.9% annually in constant terms while population 
growth rate was 2.5% per year. By international comparisons, these are 
quite satisfactory figures and suggest a continuous process of real income 
growth for the average Syrian. 
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INSERT TABLE 1 
 
The national absolute poverty declined from 14.3% in 1996-1997 to 
11.4% in 2003-2004 (El Laithy and Abu-Ismail, 2005). Over the same 
period in rural areas overall poverty declined from 22.6% to 11.1% (despite 
a 2% increase in North-eastern region), while in urban areas poverty 
declined from 14.8% to 9.0%. Most of the poor (61.2%) still live in rural 
areas. The Syrian poverty profile also shows significant regional disparities. 
Inequality in Syria remains quite high. The unequal distribution of the 
growth dividend resulted in an increase of percapita expenditure Gini index 
from 0.337 to 0.374 between 1996-1997 and 2003-2004. Only in Rural 
Southern and Urban Coastal regions the economic growth resulted in a less 
unequal distribution.  
The dynamics of GDP per capita has been influenced over the last 
decades mainly by the performances of the oil sector and agriculture. 
Agriculture has traditionally been Syria’s main industry (Sarris, 2003). 
However, in the 1970s trade followed by mining and to a lesser extent 
industry started to grow at higher rates than agriculture. Nevertheless, 
agriculture is still an important sector of the Syrian economy, contributing 
one-fifth to country’s GDP in 2010. Furthermore, agriculture plays a 
strategic role in generating foreign exchange, or saving foreign exchange 
through import substitution, as well as for implementing domestic welfare 
policy as far as food subsidies are concerned. 
Syria’s growth performance has strengthened over the last decade, 
reflecting not only the hitherto favourable external environment for oil-
producing countries, but also the country’s own reform efforts. Indeed, the 
new globalisation drive, regional competition for access to global markets, 
and internal socio-economic challenges prompted a debate within the 
government to initiate drastic economic reforms. This process started at the 
turn of the century but has been officially endorsed in the tenth Five Year 
Plan (2006-2010) with the objective of implementing the transition to a 
‛social market economy’, which is a market oriented economy where the 
government still plays a crucial role in creating a favourable environment for 
free activities and competitiveness, while ensuring that market players 
behave responsibly. This change determined greater openness and 
flexibility, including cutting lending interest rates, opening private banks, 
consolidating multiple exchange rates, raising prices on some subsidised 
items (e.g. gasoline and cement), and establishing the Damascus Stock 
Exchange. In addition the Government of Syria issued decrees to encourage 
corporate ownership reform, and to allow the Central Bank to issue Treasury 
bills and bonds for government debt. This implied a greater openness to 
private initiatives and foreign economic relations4 and paved the way for an 
                                                 
4 The country has important relations with neighbouring countries and 
concluded a set of bilateral or regional trade agreements such as the Arab 
Free Trade Area Agreement. Moreover, Syria has significantly increased its 
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easier adaptation of the Syrian economy to the fast evolving domestic and 
international context. Nevertheless, the economy remains largely controlled 
by the government. 
Syria’s most recent macroeconomic performance has been affected by 
on-going external and domestic shocks, particularly the impact of the global 
financial crisis and a prolonged drought that has been affecting agricultural 
output (IMF, 2010). While inflation reached 15.2% in 2008, reflecting 
Syria’s high dependence on imports of food and fuel combined with a three 
year drought and the removal of some subsidies, inflationary pressures 
were contained through prudent macroeconomic policies going down to 
2.9% in 2009. Yet, inflation increased again to 4.4% in 2010 as a result of 
commodity prices recover and fuel prices rise. Foreign assets remain high, 
but their coverage of imports is declining. Although debt remains moderate, 
the recourse to debt to finance budget deficit is likely to increase with the 
progressive decline in oil revenues. Moreover, in a move to appease popular 
discontent, over the last months the Syrian Government has partially rolled 
back economic reforms enacted over the last years, re-introducing some 
fiscally unsustainable agricultural and energy subsidies and raising public 
sector salaries. As a result the growth slowed by only 1 percentage point in 
2009 compared to 2008 and the Syrian economy did continue to grow at a 
rate of 4% in the midst of the global crisis. However, Syrian GDP grew only 
3.2% in 2010. 
Over the short and medium term, Syria’s recovery will ultimately depend 
on the outcome of the ongoing popular uprising and the scope of political 
reforms. Even with a successful political transition, in incoming years Syria 
will face the dual challenges of: (i) keeping strong growth and developing 
non-oil sectors to cope with still important demographic pressures and with 
the decline in oil production, and (ii) maintaining fiscal sustainability while 
providing social protection to a growing number of young unemployed and 
to climate affected areas (World Bank, 2011). To sustain long-run growth, 
Syria will need to further develop and diversify its economy away from the 
oil sector, improve private sector development and exports. Economic 
constraints include declining oil production, high unemployment, rising 
budget deficits, and increasing pressure on water supplies caused by heavy 
use in agriculture, rapid population growth, industrial expansion, and water 
pollution.  
4. Methodology 
4.1. Data 
The impact assessment of agriculture policy reforms, commodity price 
spikes and global recession has been carried out updating and 
                                                                                                                                                            
trade with the EU, especially the agricultural trade that in 2008 accounted 
for 36% of Syrian exports and 29% of imports (IMF, 2010). Syria has also 
decided to move outward and to seek WTO accession. 
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disaggregating a social accounting matrix of Syrian economy estimated by 
the National Agricultural Policy Centre of Damascus with reference to year 
2004 (NAPC, 2008). The final model includes accounts for 51 commodities, 
41 production activities, 2 factors of production, and 22 institutions. Specific 
attention has been given to the disaggregation of agriculture (31 
commodities and 28 activities) and food sector (15 commodities and 8 
activities). Despite the lack of a complete urban-rural disaggregation of 
accounts, a regional criterion has been used in the classification of 
households’ accounts according to where they live. Moreover, given the 
objective of the study (that is assessing impacts on poverty and inequality), 
households are also classified by deciles of per capita equivalent 
expenditure. These two criteria have been applied hierarchically: first 
households were ranked according to consumption expenditure deciles of 
total population; then, they were classified as urban/rural. Therefore the 
resulting twenty groups represented in the SAM do not include the same 
number of households, the population included in each group depending on 
the relative importance of rural-urban areas in each decile of total 
population. 
The analysis of the impacts of exogenous shocks on poverty was carried 
out building on a household budget dataset made available by Central 
Bureau of Statistics, which is suitable to be used for living standard 
measurement studies (Grosh and Glewwe, 2000). In fact in 2004 a 
nationally representative sample of 29,800 households were asked to fill 
two questionnaires on the composition of households’ expenditure and on 
household characteristics (composition by sex and age, education 
attainment, occupation, sources of income, owned assets). Individual 
poverty lines had been estimated for each observed household, according to 
the household size and composition (affecting consumption needs) and the 
region where the household lives (affecting the cost of living) (El Laithy and 
Abu-Ismail, 2005). 
In our study these poverty lines have been used to estimate household-
member-specific poverty lines (elderly, adult male, adult female and child) 
and for each region. Then, according to their composition, all households 
included in the sample have been reclassified as poor and non-poor, with 
the poor being concentrated in the lower four deciles and mostly in the first 
two (Table 2). Finally, we estimated the household-specific poverty 
elasticities to be used for simulations: as expected poverty elasticity are 
larger in higher consumption expenditure deciles. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
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4.2. SAM Modelling5  
The first step in SAM modelling is the identification of endogenous and 
exogenous accounts. Usually, for small economies and for policy analysis 
purposes, the government and the rest of the world are considered as 
exogenous, that is the model does not explain the behaviour of those 
accounts. The process of capital formation could be considered as 
exogenous whenever the research question does not focus on dynamic 
impacts, as is the case in our study. Therefore these three accounts are 
considered as exogenous. 
Using micro-data from El Laithy and Abu-Ismail (2005), good-specific 
expenditure elasticities have been estimated for each population decile and 
then used to substitute the resulting marginal propensities to final 
consumption expenditures for the average ones directly derivable from the 
SAM, as originally suggested by Pyatt and Round (1979).  
A standard SAM is a linear model that assumes perfect elasticity of 
supply in all sectors, which means that output changes are fully demand-
driven and any increase in the exogenous demand for 
commodities/activities is perfectly matched by an increase in output, 
according to fixed price multipliers. This assumption is generally considered 
unrealistic for developing countries agriculture, where the output level is 
largely determined by policy interventions. For instance, in Syria this is the 
case of the so-called ‘strategic crops’. The presence of supply side 
constraints in one or more sectors can be taken into account in a linear 
model calculating a so-called ‛mixed multiplier matrix’ (Lewis and 
Thorbecke, 1992).  
Simulations of the distributive impacts of alternative agricultural policy 
reforms in Syria have been carried out using a fixed price, mixed multiplier 
model, assuming different hypotheses about supply constraints, (cf. section 
4.3 below). First, the matrix of mixed multipliers has been used to assess 
the impact on output and incomes of different policy scenarios. Two further 
analyses have been carried out to better understand the distributive impacts 
of simulations. The first is a particular transformation of the multipliers 
matrix (cf. Roland-Holst and Sancho, 1992) to show the changes in the 
relative position in income distribution of different household groups. A 
second analysis was carried out to assess the potential impacts of reforms 
on poverty, following the approach originally proposed by Pyatt and Round 
(2006).  
4.3. Policy scenarios and simulation approach 
The simulations carried out with the SAM of the Syrian economy refer to 
two major sources of changes in the policy and economic environment, 
namely the liberalisation of the agricultural sector and the major shocks that 
                                                 
5 A formal exposition of the model is provided in the Appendix. 
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have hit the Syrian economy over the last years, that are the food price 
crisis and the global recession.  
Policy reforms are simulated as a vector of exogenous shocks, which 
mimics the recent evolution in Syrian policy environment, namely: 
a) dropping production subsidies,6 which will turn out into an increase in 
production costs. These direct impacts on production sectors will also 
affect households’ welfare through an economy-wide increase in 
commodity prices.7 This vector of price was then multiplied by the 
(SAM-derived) matrix of expenditure shares of households to obtain 
an equivalent decrease of income in real terms, which is the 
exogenous shock vector eventually used to simulate this policy 
change; 
b) reducing by 20% the supported price of the ‛strategic crops’ whose 
only buyer is the Syrian Government (cotton, tobacco and sugar 
beet). Assuming intermediate costs and wages as fixed in the short-
run, the reduction of output prices can be mimicked by a decrease in 
incomes accruing to ‛other factors’ (capital, self-employed labour). 
Therefore, a first component of the exogenous shock vector was 
defined as a reduction of incomes distributed to households by ‘other 
factors’, according to shares accruing to each household group. At the 
same time, an offsetting increase in real incomes, resulting from the 
deflationary impact of previously subsidised commodities, was added;8  
c) dropping the existing food stamp scheme (that is the so-called ‛Price 
Stabilization Fund’, PSF).9 The direct effect of the elimination of food 
consumption subsidies was distributed among households groups as a 
real income decrease, according to shares in expenditures for 
subsidised products resulting from households budgets in the El Laithy 
and Abu-Ismail (2005) sample. 
Moreover, each of the above policy options was considered along with 
different ‘closure rule’, that is effects on Government budget. By and large 
the selected policies would result in a reduction of public expenditure. The 
Government can then use the resulting saving in public expenditure 
                                                 
6 Subsidised activities whose accounts are included in the SAM are: soft 
wheat, cotton ginning, milling, sugar industry and sugar refinery. 
7 Indeed, assuming the transpose of the multiplier matrix as a Leontief 
model in prices, it is possible to transform an output cost increase as an 
equivalent commodity price increase (Roland Holst and Sancho, 1995; 
Dietzenbacher, 2002). 
8 In fact a general decrease of prices is expected, through input-output 
linkages, as a result of the price reduction of previously subsidised 
commodities. This component was calculated following the same procedure 
used for scenario a). 
9 The balance of PSF revenues and expenditures was estimated applying 
shares derived from Lucke (2001) to the total value of PSF expenditures 
projected for 2007 (cf. IMF, 2007). 
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according to alternative budget strategies, each having different distributive 
effects. Three alternatives have been hypothesised, namely: 
i) a Government deficit reduction, which translates into an increase of 
previously crowded-out private investments (Rose et al., 2001). This 
alternative is mimicked through an exogenous injection in the final 
demand for investment goods (according to SAM shares) equal to the 
amount of Government expenditure saving resulting from policy 
reform; 
ii) a Government expenditure increase equal to the amount of money 
saved as a result of policy reform, modelled as an exogenous inflows 
to SAM accounts according to Government expenditure shares (both 
for public final consumptions and for transfers to institutions); 
iii) an increase of transfers to households according to shares in the 
original SAM. This budget rule is to some extent similar to the 
compensative payments introduced by the Syrian Government with 
the institution of the Agricultural Support Fund (IMF, 2010). 
In summary, the combination of the three policy options for agriculture 
and food and the three closure rules for Government budget yields nine 
policy mixes whose impacts are simulated in section 5.2. 
On top of these domestic policy changes, over the last five years the 
macroeconomic dynamics at the global level heavily affected output, 
incomes and poverty in Syria. In order to assess the impacts of these 
shocks mixed scenarios have been simulated including alternatively the 
effect of a 100% cereal price increase and the effect of the 2009 recession 
scenario on Syria. The preliminary estimates included in the IMF Staff 
Report for the 2009 Article IV consultation (IMF, 2010) record a 16% 
decrease in exports of goods and a 4% decrease in workers’ remittances 
from abroad: these changes were applied to SAM totals to estimate a vector 
of exogenous shocks. 10 
Finally, it should be emphasised that all simulations were carried out 
taking into account also a set of policy-driven constraints on the supply 
side, using different matrices of mixed multipliers. First of all, production 
activities for the three strategic crops (cotton, tobacco, sugar beet) were 
considered as supply-constrained under scenarios a) and c).11 A second 
constraint was included for the public administration sector. Despite general 
services managed by Government are usually modelled as an activity in a 
SAM framework, the figures in the relevant column/row are generally 
determined by the policy maker. Indeed, in National Accounts the output 
value of public administration is conventionally set equal to its production 
cost (cf. United Nations et al., 1993). As a result, modelling public 
                                                 
10 The simulated impact of this scenario on total output is consistent with 
the actual slow down of Syrian GDP (IMF, 2010). 
11 The constraint does not operate under scenario b) assuming that the 
reduction in price support was combined with a liberalisation of production 
decisions for strategic crops. 
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administration as a supply-constrained sector can be interpreted as a policy-
driven effort towards efficiency in the sector activities. The changes induced 
by exogenous shocks are computed assuming that in the short-run the 
public administration could support the overall economy without changing 
the nominal value of its output. According to financial stabilization goals 
stated by the Syrian Government this seems to be a reasonable 
assumption. The introduction of supply-side constraints is expected to 
reduce the multiplier effect generated by exogenous shocks on the 
economy: indeed, indirect and induced effects cannot be transmitted to the 
rest of the economy through the constrained sectors.12 
5. Simulation results 
5.1. Multiplier analysis 
Simulation results strictly depend on production structure. Therefore, 
output multipliers generated by exogenous shocks on demand for 
production activities provide information that can prove useful in 
interpreting policy simulation results (table 3).13 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
Output multipliers are good indicators for the growth potential of the 
Syrian economy and prove the important role played by policies aiming at 
increasing final demand. As expected the lower the share of intermediate 
costs on output value (agriculture, services) the smaller the output 
multiplier. ‛Food, beverage and tobacco’ is the industry with the highest 
multiplier.14 Table 3 shows also how the output increase is distributed across 
different industries. While ‛Agriculture’ and ‛Food, beverage and tobacco’ 
activities are able to generate an output increase also in other industries 
through backward linkages, the opposite is not true: output growth in non-
agro-food sectors does not stimulate growth in ‛Agriculture’ and ‛Food, 
beverage and tobacco’ sectors. 
                                                 
12 A sensitivity analysis carried out to assess the effect of the removal of 
supply-side constraint on public administration showed an average increase 
of output multiplier of about 20%. 
13 The final demand directed towards a given production activity is the 
weighted average of the demand for each commodity produced by the 
activity itself net of leakages (imports and relevant taxes). 
14 However, it should be stressed that this sector includes activities like 
‛Sugar refinery’ and ‛Milling’ that are mainly publicly owned and/or heavily 
subsidised. As a result, the ratio between intermediate costs and the value 
of output in the input-output block of the SAM is higher than it would be 
without policy interventions. 
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Distribution effects can be assessed looking at income multipliers, that is 
multipliers accounting for increases in incomes distributed to institutions as 
a result of final demand increases (table 4).  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
Manufacturing activities (both food and non food) typically show a higher 
capacity to increase incomes of Syrian households as a whole. Comparing 
urban vs. rural multipliers, a common pattern emerges: the multiplier effect 
on incomes of urban households is significantly larger than that for rural 
households (at least 50% larger). Furthermore, the impacts are larger on 
incomes of richer households, with a ratio between the top and bottom 
deciles that ranges from four in rural areas to ten in urban areas.  
5.2. Impact of liberalisation policy reforms 
Table 5 shows the results of simulations carried out according to the 
policy scenarios as defined in section 4.3. The impacts are presented as a 
percentage change in the value of output, income and poverty.  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
Both the elimination of production subsidies and the reduction of price 
support to strategic crops show a potential positive effect on Syrian 
economy. Whatever the budget closure, the multiplicative effect exceeds 
the direct negative impacts caused on household incomes by the exogenous 
shocks (that is the decrease of incomes in real terms because of the 
adverse change in prices and of the reduction in income accruing to 
factors). Specifically, the elimination of subsidies to production activities 
determines the largest increases on output and income. These overall 
impacts result in a reduction of poverty (holding population constant). The 
multiplier effect is larger for closure rules aiming at increasing transfers to 
households and reducing the Government deficit. 
The impacts generated by the third policy scenario (elimination of PSF) 
show mixed evidence. The positive effect of a deficit reduction on output 
(+0.56%) is not large enough to offset the real term decrease of 
households’ income due to the elimination of food stamps (-1.99%). Even 
worst would be the impacts of an increase in public expenditure (output 
contraction of -0.38%, income decrease equal to -2.57%). Only reallocating 
financial resources to households through transfers minimises the adverse 
effects of this policy on income distribution. The elimination of food 
consumption subsidies generates an increase of poverty whatever the 
adopted budget rule. Even in the case of the third ‘closure rule’ the resulting 
direct support to households’ income is not large enough to generate, 
through the multiplier effect in the whole economy, an expenditure increase 
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offsetting the direct cut of real incomes: the overall impact is a 0.19% 
increase in the poverty headcount ratio.15  
Table 6 shows the impacts on inequality implied by alternative policy 
scenarios as percentage changes comparing the after and before situation in 
each income decile. Redistribution resulting by the implementation of each 
policy is modelled as a zero sum game: the winners show a positive value 
while the losers show a negative value, but the algebraic sum of the 
percentage changes in income shares across population deciles is equal to 
zero. The magnitude of the total redistributive effect in absolute terms (last 
row) obviously depends on the different amount of financial resources 
allocated to the three alternative policies. Nonetheless, the choice of the 
budget rules has a significant impact on redistribution under each policy. As 
expected, allocating financial resources to household transfers sharply 
increases the total redistributive effect of the first two policy options 
(elimination of production subsidies and reduction of strategic crops price). 
Furthermore, the redistributive profiles are different under alternative 
policy scenarios. The strategic crops price reduction is the most equitable 
policy determining an improvement in the relative position of poorer 
households and rural households. Vice versa, the first and the third policy 
options negatively affect the relative position of rural households in income 
distribution whatever the adopted budget rule. Not surprisingly the worst 
redistributive impact is determined by the elimination of PSF. In this case, 
the redistribution of financial resources as a transfers to households, 
positively impacts urban households (including most of lower urban deciles), 
but negatively affects all rural deciles but the highest one; the other two 
budget rules leads to adverse effects on urban poor too. These results 
clearly call for a careful targeting of transfers to households to prevent 
adverse distributive effects.16 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 
 
The overall poverty impact of policy reforms is small (table 7). The first 
two policy options reduce poverty whatever the closure rule adopted for 
Government budget. The elimination of production subsidies with an 
equivalent increase in transfers to households is the most effective 
alternative in terms of poverty reduction (-0.85%). Conversely the 
elimination of food stamps may increase poverty up to 0.55% (in the case 
the public expenditure increase budget rule would be adopted). The 
transformation of PSF budget into transfers to households almost offsets 
this negative effect but with different outcomes on different household 
                                                 
15 In fact, the initial shocks (increase of direct transfers less real income 
reduction due to the elimination of food subsidies) negatively impacted one 
half of households, mainly in rural areas. 
16 Simulations were carried out assuming that transfers were distributed 
among households groups according to the SAM shares. 
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groups. Indeed, poverty is reduced only for relatively less poor deciles in 
the urban areas, while the rural poor are all negatively affected. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 
 
5.3. Impact of cereal price spike and global recession 
The impacts on income distribution of the three simulations mimicking 
the macroeconomic shocks are assessed computing two indicators: the 
policy scenario ‘balance’ is just the algebraic sum of positive and negative 
impacts as percentage to total redistributive impact (last row of table 6); 
the policy scenario ‛bias’ is instead the sum of only negative impacts (as 
percentage to total redistribution) accruing to a given group of households. 
In short, the ‛balance’ indicator shows how gains and losses offset each 
other across households, while the ‛bias’, focusing only on negatively 
affected households, provides a measure of concentration of losses: a value 
higher than 50% means that the negative impacts are larger than positive 
impacts within the considered household groups (either poor households, 
irrespective where they live, or rural households). These indicators are 
computed with reference to two targeting groups of households: ‛equity’ 
indicators refer to the first four deciles of total population, which include all 
poor households (cf. table 2); the ‛rural’ indicators refer to all rural 
households.  
The impacts on the Syrian economy are quite differentiated (Table 8). 
From an equity point of view all scenarios imply redistribution, with negative 
impacts accruing mainly to richer households, especially in the case of the 
two global recession scenarios (reduction in transfers and exports). A 
decrease in exports is the worst scenario for richer households: more than 
70% of negative impacts accrues to households in higher deciles of 
population, although the absolute redistribution implied by this scenario is 
only one third of the other one (162 vs. 500 Million SP). In the case of an 
increase of cereal price, the balance between gains and losses in the 
redistributive game is negative for poorer households as a whole (-11.3%): 
the negative impacts on urban poor are not offset by positive effects on 
rural poor. 
Another significant asymmetric effect of macroeconomic scenarios refers 
to the rural-urban bias. The relative position of rural households in income 
distribution is clearly worsened by a price crisis (more than 64.2% of 
negative effects accruing to rural households, while in terms of balance the 
value is only slightly negative) as well as in the case of a 10% decrease of 
transfers to households from abroad (rural bias equal to 73.7% and rural 
balance equal to -56.8%); vice versa, the export contraction determines a 
relative improvement in the distributive position of rural households (rural 
bias less than 50%, and a positive balance). 
All scenarios imply an increase of the poverty headcount. The larger 
impacts on poverty are determined directly by the increase of cereals’ price 
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(+0.39%, through a larger reduction in real income of poorer households) 
and indirectly by a reduction of export (+0.33%, through the resulting slow 
down of domestic production). Quite surprisingly, the reduction of workers’ 
remittances does not affect too much poverty. 
 
INSERT TABLE 8 
 
How do adverse changes in the global scenario affect the outcomes of 
agricultural policy reforms considered in section 5.2? Table 9 contrasts the 
impacts of mixed scenarios for all policy options including the effects of 
different macroeconomic changes vis-à-vis those computed in absence of 
macroeconomic changes. 
The pure macroeconomic scenarios led to a relative inequality 
improvement, but characterised by a slight increase in poverty and a 
significantly adverse rural bias. The first two liberalisation reform options 
would be able to alleviate the adverse effects of macroeconomic changes on 
poverty and equity. However, there is a trade-off between poverty reduction 
and equity improvement: the best result in terms of poverty alleviation is 
achieved by the elimination of support to production activities coupled with 
an equivalent transfer to households, while the liberalisation of strategic 
crops (price reduction plus removal of policy-driven supply constraints) 
shows the lowest equity bias (even null in absence of macroeconomic 
changes). 
 
INSERT TABLE 9 
 
Looking at the rural bias, the only policy option able to offset the 
adverse effect of macroeconomic changes is the liberalisation of strategic 
crops coupled either with a reduction of Government deficit or with a 
proportional increase of public expenditure. 
Finally, the elimination of the PSF leads to the worst impacts in terms of 
poverty and equity, showing at the same time a very large adverse rural 
bias (more than 74% irrespective of the adopted budget closing rule). This 
result clearly shows that without a careful targeting of transfers to 
households, the positive achievement in terms of growth would be socially 
controversial. 
6. Concluding remarks 
This study shows that liberalisation reforms aiming at reducing the 
distortions generated by agricultural policy in Syria (such as production 
subsidies and price support for strategic crops) could generally have a 
positive effect on both growth (output and incomes) and poverty, while a 
controversial impact would be generated by the elimination of food security 
interventions (such as the food stamp scheme financed by the Price 
Stabilization Fund). 
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The redistributive profiles of alternative policy scenarios are very 
different and heavily affected by the adopted ‛budget closure rules’. While 
the elimination of price support results in the best redistribution profile, 
improving the relative position of the poor both in urban and rural areas, 
the reduction of production subsidies and the elimination of the food stamp 
scheme show an adverse distributive bias towards rural households. 
Furthermore, the elimination of food stamps is likely to generate a poverty 
increase no matter what budget rule is adopted: only increasing the 
transfers to households may partially offset this negative effect, but just in 
urban areas. 
Relevant changes in the global macro-economic scenario affected 
poverty as well as inequality in Syria: simulations show that the recent 
cereal price spikes and the global recession had a relative positive equity 
impact, but increased poverty and had an adverse bias against rural 
households. Should the liberalisation reforms be in place at the moment of 
these shocks, the overall impact of food price spikes and global recession 
would be less negative, while the elimination of food security measures 
(that is the Price Stabilization Fund) would make their impacts worse. 
Two fundamental policy implications can be drawn by this study. First, 
the agricultural sector liberalisation shows a significant growth potential and 
is likely to determine positive effects on poverty through a generalised 
increase of incomes; furthermore, the elimination of measures such as 
subsidies to agricultural production and price support for strategic crops 
would reduce public expenditures making available budget resources that 
could be used for pursuing other policy goals. Second, in the short-run there 
is a structural trade-off between equity improvements and poverty 
alleviation: the policy options that will more likely reduce absolute poverty 
show undesirable distributive biases (both on overall inequality and on rural 
households vis-à-vis urban households). These results are consistent with 
the most recent debate on agricultural policy reform options in developing 
countries and calls for a careful targeting of how to use budget savings 
generated by agriculture liberalisation. 
In terms of modelling strategy, despite the linear nature of the social 
account matrix model, the adopted flexible modelling approach allowed the 
simulation of a variety of scenarios characterized by a mix of supply side 
constraints and alternative interventions resulting from liberalisation budget 
savings. These adaptations have increased a lot the degree of realism of the 
model, providing useful policy insights through the assessment of the 
impacts on poverty and inequality. One may wonder whether a non-linear 
model, such as a computable general equilibrium model, would do better in 
terms of simulation results. However, as emphasised by Rose (1995), 
assuming an approach as intrinsically superior to another is nonsense 
without carefully considering the specific issues to be addressed in 
modelling. The generally out-of-equilibrium conditions of the Syrian 
economy, where the system is still largely policy-driven and several 
constraints limit the adjustment of economic activities, would probably not 
be properly modelled by using the equilibrium framework of a CGE model. 
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The purpose of the analyses carried out in this paper is rather to show how 
impacts spread across sectors in the short-run, highlighting the distributive 
asymmetries that are likely to come along with policy reforms as well as 
macroeconomic shocks.  
Lastly, we acknowledge that the SAM-based policy impact assessment 
could be further improved. For example, a complete rural-urban 
classification of production activities accounts would make possible a 
complete representation of structural asymmetries between the two regions 
and the estimation of spill over effects between rural and urban areas. 
Referring to modelling, further improvements could be achieved through the 
adoption of ‛optimization’ rules (that is according to some desirable 
distributive rules) in designing policies financed by liberalisation budget 
savings. Finally, in a transition economy such as Syria, a dynamic approach 
to modelling would surely do better in mimicking alternative paths towards 
a market economy. 
 
Appendix. A formal exposition of the model 
Using micro-data from a survey on households’ budgets (El Laithy and 
Abu-Ismail, 2005), good-specific expenditure elasticities have been 
estimated for each population decile and then used to build the modified 
matrix of expenditure propensities C whose elements are calculated as 
follows: 
 
cij = ηijaij 
 
where ηij is the expenditure elasticity of sector j towards sector i. As first 
approximation, a linear model could be calibrated as follows: 
 
y = (I – C)-1x = Mcx (A.1) 
 
where Mc is the matrix of fixed price multipliers (Pyatt and Round, 1979). 
The system in equation (A.1) may be used as a basis for policy analysis 
simulations as follows: 
 
dy = Mcdx (A.2) 
 
where dx is a vector of changes in exogenous injections, representing 
different policy scenarios. However, model (A.1) assumes perfect elasticity 
of supply in all sectors This assumption is generally considered unrealistic 
for developing countries agriculture.The presence of supply side constraints 
in one or more sectors can be taken into account in a linear model 
calculating a so-called ‛mixed multiplier matrix’ (Lewis and Thorbecke, 
1992). Suppose to identify k (out of n) sectors that are supply-constrained. 
The matrix C can be partitioned as follows: 
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where the C blocks with subscripts nc and c identify the marginal 
expenditures propensities of non supply-constrained and supply-constrained 
sectors, with dimensions [(n-k) x (n-k)] and [k x k] respectively; T is the [k x 
(n-k)] matrix of expenditure propensities of factors, institutions and non 
supply-constrained sectors on supply-constrained sectors; Q is the [(n-k) x 
k] matrix of supply-constrained sectors expenditures on factors, institutions 
and non supply-constrained sectors output. The matrix of mixed multipliers 
can be calculated as follows: 
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where I and 0 are the identity and null matrices with appropriate 
dimensions. The mixed multiplier matrix can substitute matrix Mc in equation 
(2). 
The redistributive effects have been analysed using a particular 
transformation of matrix Mm proposed by Roland-Holst and Sancho (1992) to 
show the changes in the relative position in income distribution of different 
household groups. According to these authors, the change in a normalised 
measure of income shares ŷ induced by an exogenous injection dx is given by 
 
dŷ= [i′y]-1[I – ŷi′] Minst dx = Rdx (A.5) 
 
where Minst is the (n × m) submatrix of Mm corresponding to income 
multipliers of the n institutions considered for m different exogenous shocks 
(on sectors, factors and institutions). According to (A.5) the matrix of 
absolute (that is non normalised) values of redistributive effects is given by 
 
R* = I′yR = [I – ŷi′] Minst. (A.6) 
 
Equation (A.6) yields the value of the redistribution induced by an 
additional unit of exogenous inflow while total income is held constant at its 
initial level.  In other words, R* is a sign-preserving transformation of R 
where the elements of each column sum to zero, as in the case of the 
original matrix, since only redistributive effects are accounted for. The 
redistribution matrix R* shows the changes of income that each group would 
perform if only the redistributive effects of exogenous impacts were taken 
into account, excluding output/income changes due to exogenous shocks. 
This means that the impact of an exogenous shock is modelled as a 
redistributive zero-sum game among different socio-economic groups . 
A second analysis was carried out to assess the potential impacts of 
reforms on poverty, following the approach proposed by Pyatt and Round 
(2006). Given a measure of poverty S based on the definition of a poverty 
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line, we can assume that the measure itself is additively decomposable 
across groups of households. Therefore 
 
∑=
i
iSS  (A.7) 
 
where i is a generic household group. Defining the number of people 
included in a socio-economic group, ni, and the proportion of poor in the 
same group, Pi, we can write: 
 
Si = niPi (A.8) 
 
and the change in the poverty measure for each group is 
 
dSi = nidPi + Pidni . (A.9) 
 
Ignoring the effect of population growth (that is the second term on the 
right hand side) the change in the proportion Pi of people that are poor will 
depend on changes in the average income as well as on changes in prices 
able to differentially move poverty lines across socio-economic groups. As 
changes in prices cannot be represented in a fixed-price model, the analysis 
will account only for the effect on poverty due to changes in the scale of 
incomes within each household group. Pyatt and Round (2006) show that 
the change in the number of poor in a generic socio-economic group is 
given by 
 
xMz d
yn
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')1( εε −+=  (A.10) 
 
where, εI is the partial elasticity of Pi to changes in the average income 
within the i-th group (poverty elasticity); 
yi is the total income of the i-th household group; 
zi is a vector with the i-th element equal to 1 and all the other 
elements equal to 0; 
MmI is the sub-matrix (g x n) of income mixed multipliers for 
households groups where g is the number of households groups 
and n is the number of rows/columns of matrix Mm; 
x  is the vector of inflows from the exogenous sectors in the 
original SAM. 
Equation (A.10) implies that the number of poor in a socio-economic 
group decreases only if the increase in the average income resulting from 
economic growth (that is the second term of the right hand side) offsets the 
negative effect of population growth on poverty. Poverty elasticities 
estimated in table 2 have been used to calculate the second term of the 
right hand side of the equation (A.10), that is the effect of exogenous 
changes on poverty with population held constant. 
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Table 1. Syria selected indicators, 2010 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
Land area (sq. km) (thousands) 183.6 
Population, total (millions) 20.4 
Population growth (annual %) 2.0 
GDP (current US$) (billions) 59.1 
GDP growth (annual %) 3.2 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 4.4 
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)b 22.9 
Unemployment, total (% of total labour force)a 8.4 
Merchandise trade (% of GDP) 51.4 
GNI, Atlas method (current US$) (billions) 56.3 
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) 2,750 
GNI, PPP (current international $) (billions) 104.6 
GNI per capita, PPP (current international $) 5,120 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)b 75.6 
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000) 16.0 
Fertility rate, total (births per woman)b 3.0 
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 84.2 
a Year 2007; b Year 2009. 
 
Table 2. Poor headcount ratios and poverty 
elasticities 
Source: Authors’ own calculation 
Deciles 
Poor within 
groups (%) 
Poor on 
total 
population 
(%) 
Poverty 
elasticitie
s 
Urban households 
1st 97.28 28.56 -0.25 
2nd 67.12 19.87 -4.34 
3rd 11.36 3.52 -8.19 
4th 0.04 0.01 -10.00 
Rural households 
1st 93.21 28.17 -0.56 
2nd 57.79 17.34 -4.57 
3rd 8.80 2.52 -8.48 
 
Table 3. Output multipliers and shares resulting by an increase in 
final demand of selected industries 
Source: Authors’ own calculation 
Industries 
Output 
multiplier 
Agriculture 
(% of 
total) 
Food 
industry 
(% of total) 
Other 
activities 
(% of total) 
Agriculture 2.04 58.0 5.9 36.1 
Food beverage and 
tobacco 2.97 10.4 58.1 31.5 
Other manufactures 2.28 8.3 8.5 83.3 
Utilities 2.48 5.7 5.3 89.0 
Building and 
construction 2.17 5.3 4.9 89.8 
Services 1.86 7.0 5.9 87.1 
Public administration 2.01 8.1 6.8 85.1 
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Table 4. Income multipliers resulting by an increase in final demand of selected 
industries 
Source: Authors’ own calculation 
Urban Rural 
Industries Total 
Syria 
All 
house-
holds 
1st 
decile 
10th 
decile 
All 
house-
holds 
1st 
decile 
10th 
decile 
Agriculture 0.737 0.440 0.012 0.134 0.297 0.014 0.058 
Food beverage and 
tobacco 1.020 0.608 0.016 0.185 0.411 0.019 0.080 
Other manufactures 1.014 0.605 0.016 0.184 0.409 0.019 0.079 
Utilities 0.809 0.483 0.013 0.147 0.326 0.015 0.063 
Building and construction 0.656 0.392 0.010 0.119 0.265 0.012 0.051 
Services 0.801 0.478 0.013 0.146 0.323 0.015 0.063 
Public administration 0.984 0.587 0.016 0.179 0.397 0.018 0.077 
 
Table 5. Impacts of selected policies 
Source: Authors’ own calculation 
Percentage impact on Policies 
Output Income Poverty 
Elimination of subsidies to agriculture 
     Deficit reduction 3.10 2.00 -0.20 
   Public expenditure increase 1.11 0.78 -0.08 
   Transfers to households 2.07 6.43 -0.85 
Price support reduction for strategic 
     Deficit reduction 0.43 0.32 -0.04 
   Public expenditure increase 0.16 0.16 -0.02 
   Transfers to households 0.30 0.90 -0.12 
Elimination of PSF 
      Deficit reduction 0.56 -1.99 0.49 
   Public expenditure increase -0.38 -2.57 0.55 
   Transfers to households 0.08 0.10 0.19 
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Table 6. Redistributive impacts of selected policies 
Source: Authors’ own calculation 
Elimination of subsidies to 
agriculture and food industry 
Price support reduction for 
strategic crops 
Elimination of PSF 
Deciles 
Deficit 
reduction 
Public 
expend. 
increase 
Transfer 
increase 
Deficit 
reduction 
Public 
expend. 
increase 
Transfer 
increase 
Deficit 
reduction 
Public 
expend. 
increase 
Transfer 
increase 
Urban          
1st -3.58 6.86 17.02 0.11 8.37 17.09 -6.70 -6.35 1.38 
2nd 0.42 5.39 11.95 5.95 8.84 12.28 -7.35 -7.20 -1.84 
3rd 4.40 7.99 14.20 6.79 9.28 14.29 -4.68 -4.52 1.84 
4th 0.07 7.61 15.59 2.46 8.41 15.60 -3.98 -3.69 3.36 
5th 1.94 11.90 23.51 3.68 11.90 23.41 -2.91 -2.48 8.18 
6th -0.48 4.10 6.36 -2.07 2.35 6.14 1.15 1.36 4.23 
7th 3.95 4.53 1.59 -3.92 -1.42 0.99 1.69 1.78 2.37 
8th 8.69 6.74 1.16 -7.54 -5.11 0.01 6.94 7.03 7.39 
9th 16.51 14.81 8.51 -15.69 -8.99 6.12 18.17 18.49 22.17 
10th 53.41 30.06 -5.04 -47.40 -42.50 -12.20 50.60 50.77 47.78 
Rural 
households 
         
1st -6.02 -4.23 -0.65 11.17 8.39 0.63 -11.22 -11.34 -11.62 
2nd -8.46 -5.22 0.09 12.55 10.06 1.63 -12.01 -12.10 -12.00 
3rd -11.84 -6.43 0.02 7.98 7.77 1.42 -12.81 -12.85 -12.75 
4th -7.21 -5.89 -1.17 14.01 9.71 0.39 -12.49 -12.65 -13.14 
5th -10.98 -9.57 -5.47 10.55 6.33 -3.86 -10.26 -10.44 -12.78 
6th -16.79 -15.73 -10.18 11.87 5.57 -8.03 -8.41 -8.66 -12.94 
7th -14.06 -13.13 -9.69 7.58 3.01 -8.06 -4.80 -4.98 -9.10 
8th -11.29 -15.07 -16.80 5.30 -2.15 -15.46 -2.40 -2.73 -10.13 
9th -9.28 -13.74 -18.34 -4.32 -9.37 -17.87 4.65 4.39 -3.69 
10th 10.60 -10.98 -32.65 -19.06 -30.47 -34.51 16.80 16.17 1.30 
Total absolute 
impact 
(Mln SP) 
473 660 7,102 72 97 927 7,198 7122 7,020 
 
Table 7. Impacts on poverty of selected policies (percentage changes) 
Source: Authors’ own calculation 
Elimination of subsidies  
to agro-food sector 
Price support reduction for 
strategic crops 
Elimination of PSF 
Deciles 
Deficit 
reduction 
Public 
exp. 
incr. 
Transfer 
increase 
Deficit 
reduction 
Public 
exp. 
incr. 
Transfer 
increase 
Deficit 
reduction 
Public 
exp. 
incr. 
Transfer 
increase 
Urban households         
1st -0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 
2nd -0.10 -0.04 -0.48 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.21 0.23 0.02 
3rd -0.23 -0.11 -1.13 -0.04 -0.02 -0.15 0.36 0.42 -0.06 
4th -2.78 -1.30 -13.66 -0.46 -0.26 -1.86 3.99 4.69 -1.14 
Rural households         
1st 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
2nd -0.11 -0.04 -0.38 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.33 0.37 0.20 
3rd -0.37 -0.13 -1.32 -0.07 -0.04 -0.19 1.09 1.20 0.64 
4th -2.56 -0.89 -8.37 -0.49 -0.26 -1.24 6.76 7.55 4.02 
Total -0.20 -0.08 -0.85 -0.04 -0.02 -0.12 0.49 0.55 0.19 
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Table 8. Redistributive impacts of alternative 
macroeconomic scenarios (percentage change) 
Source: Authors’ own calculation 
Deciles 
Cereals 
price 
+100% 
Transfers 
from 
abroad 
-10% 
Export 
-10% 
Urban households    
1st 10.12 -5.47 14.56 
2nd -6.60 8.48 -3.50 
3rd -17.72 18.95 -14.24 
4th -3.45 3.45 3.95 
5th -8.05 11.85 -1.63 
6th 6.39 -10.12 14.37 
7th 7.25 -8.60 10.26 
8th 4.13 -2.10 2.50 
9th 12.80 6.61 -3.83 
10th 46.35 33.71 -41.06 
Rural households    
1st 1.82 -2.00 1.94 
2nd 1.31 -4.40 5.24 
3rd 9.83 -14.24 16.09 
4th -6.62 3.29 -4.04 
5th -1.21 -6.02 4.39 
6th -4.51 -7.95 4.37 
7th -1.56 -12.15 9.16 
8th -10.88 -10.32 3.55 
9th -1.97 -16.63 9.62 
10th -37.43 13.65 -31.71 
Total absolute impact 
(Mln SP) 802 500 162 
Equity bias 34.4 26.1 21.8 
Equity balance -11.3 8.1 20.0 
Rural bias 64.2 73.7 35.7 
Rural balance -0.5 -56.8 18.6 
Poverty headcount 0.39 0.07 0.33 
 
Table 9. Impacts of alternative policy scenarios 
(percentage change) 
Source: Authors’ own calculation 
Poverty headcount Equity bias Rural bias 
Scenarios 
No 
macro-
economic 
change 
Cereals 
price 
incr. 
2008-
2009 
recession 
No macro-
economic 
change 
Cereals 
price 
incr. 
2008-
2009 
recession 
No 
macro-
economic 
change 
Cereals 
price 
incr. 
2008-
2009 
recession 
                   
Pure scenarios - 0.39 0.58 - 34.39 10.86 - 64.19 52.08 
Mixed scenarios          
  Elimination of subsidies to 
agriculture        
     Deficit 
reduction -0.20 0.19 0.38 37.11 25.66 30.26 95.94 87.45 100.00 
     Public exp. 
increase -0.08 0.31 0.50 21.77 13.52 24.26 100.00 99.43 100.00 
     Transfer -0.85 -0.46 -0.27 1.82 1.92 1.84 94.96 100.00 94.21 
 30 
increase 
  Price support reduction for strategic 
crops        
     Deficit 
reduction -0.04 0.36 0.55 0.00 20.46 22.17 23.38 77.63 41.14 
     Public exp. 
increase -0.02 0.37 0.57 0.00 18.14 21.50 41.99 81.93 48.28 
     Transfer 
increase -0.12 0.27 0.47 0.00 2.12 7.44 87.80 100.00 82.97 
  Elimination of PSF         
     Deficit 
reduction 0.49 0.88 1.07 71.22 68.89 71.12 74.39 74.07 74.84 
     Public exp. 
increase 0.55 0.94 1.13 70.70 68.38 72.41 75.76 75.36 76.23 
     Transfer 
increase 0.19 0.57 0.76 51.35 48.73 51.18 98.16 97.89 98.20 
 
